Vänsterpartiet - och det marxistiska mottot

Nu har turen (eller oturen kommit till) Vänsterpartiets grundvalar att analyseras i min serie som leder upp till valet 2010. (För att komma till huvudsidan där jag samlar alla mina poster, kolla in: VAL 2010.) Jag börjar raskt med att ge mig i kast med marxismens motto:

"Från var och en efter förmåga,

till var och en efter behov"

Liksom jag beskrev mig djupt imponerad av liberalismens motto (se tidigare post) men mycket förbryllad över hur Folkpartiet Liberalerna försöker förkroppsliga detta så finns det en rad svårigheter behäftade med även den geniala och kortfattade formuleringen ovan. Orden som är helt avgörande för mottot är: förmåga och behov. Jag tänker här ge mig i kast med en av två, nämligen behov. Detta är inte på något sätt för att förmåga skulle vara ointressant eller mindre viktigt, tvärtom är båda väldigt viktiga och samtidigt likaledes fyllda med ideologiskt innehåll.

Behov är i det här fallet begränsat till materialistiska behov. Redan här blir det problematiskt: nu ska han börja prata om religionens vikt är och varför religion ska vara politik, tänker ni... Nej, inte riktigt. Även om man vill hålla sin favoritgud utanför resonemanget så är behov i ett materialistiskt perspektiv begränsat. Behov är mat, husrum, kläder, förnödenheter. Behov är däremot inte kultur, musik, sammanhang, känsla av mening, glädje, kärlek.

En vän till mig i Polen berättade om hur det var under kommunisttiden: Ryktet spred sig att det var en last med bananer på väg mot staden. När den stora dagen kom ringlade kön runt kvarteret, folk väntade i timtal och till sist gick de hem med varsin banan. Just eftersom det här utspelade sig på kommunistisk mark är det här intressant att analysera. Fanns det någon som egentligen hade ett behov av den extremt exotiska bananen? Var det egentligen någon som slapp svälta till döds av att ha ätit just en mättande gul frukt istället för den sedvanliga havregrynsgröten (eller vad man nu åt)? Och varför sysslade det kommunistiska partiet över huvud taget med att importera en sådan helt överflödig lyxprodukt från första början? Här kan man skymta någonting i det mänskliga psyket som pekat mot att "människan inte kan leva av bröd allena". Än mindre trivialt blir det om vi exemplifierar människans icke-materialistiska behov med hur spädbarn som får allt de behöver (mat, husrum, kläder...) ändå dör om de inte får kärlek eller mänsklig kontakt.

Nästa problem är huruvida de behov som människor verkligen har är universella? Annorlunda uttryckt: är människor i grunden helt lika? Det här är möjligt att måla upp som den stora schismen mellan vänster och höger. Där intar högern positionen att människor i grunden är olika och att sociala strukturer därför inte ska styra över människans handlingsutrymme alltför mycket. Vänsterns perspektiv är att människor i grunden är lika och att sociala strukturer gör oss olika. Min analys är att dessa två, hur paradoxalt det än kan verka, är förenliga: människor är i grunden lika och olika.

Enligt mitt sätt att se gör vänstern rätt i att motverka de sociala strukturer som gör människor ojämlika. Vi har också universella behov som kan etableras, men jag skulle säga att dessa är ganska få, eller duger ganska dåligt för att formulera en politik på basis av. Högern gör rätt i att erkänna människors olika behov på individ och kollektivbasis, men att formulera en politik som lämnas helt åt medborgarna (som argumentet brukar vara - så liten stat som möjligt) gör egentligen regeringen överflödig, särskilt i en tid då internet skulle tillåta direktdemokrati och dagliga folkomröstningar om i princip allt. Då skulle vi endast behöva en administrativ apparat (som för ut information och genomför besluten) och ingen regering/riksdag.

En höger och en vänster?

Såsom jag beskrivit vänster/höger ovan, så ser inte verkligheten ut. Högern är flera partier, varav endast ett till fullo förfäktar en marknadsekonomisk modell (den som jag beskriver ovan). Det finns andra varianter, såsom KDs värdekonservatism, som egentligen har mycket litet att göra med Moderaternas politik, men som valt att ingå i en koalition med helt andra ideologiska premisser. Vänstern har frågor av en lite annan karaktär att fajtas med; en som kan delas upp i en fundamentalistisk marxism eller en progressiv.

Helt tydligt var att den polska kommunismen i någon mening var progressiv, eftersom den såg folkets behov av "helt onödiga" bananer. Så vad menar jag med fundamentalistisk? Ordet stammar från en grupp kristna amerikaner som på 20-talet (vill jag minnas) gav ut en rad pamfletter, som summerade vad kristen tro stod för i deras ögon; the fundamentals. Bland annat var detta att Bibeln skulle tolkas bokstavligt (hur man nu gör det). Så om vi överför detta till marxism så handlar fundamentalism om tron på att det går att "otolkat" tillämpa ens heliga text (i det här fallet Manifestet o Co), oavsett vilket tid vi lever i. Problemet blir att om vi försöker behålla den heliga texten intakt, så förändras begreppen runt den.

Jag utlovade en passning till Simone Weil i föregående text, och nu kommer den. Hon radar vid ett tillfälle upp en lista på vad som utgör en proletär. Dåtidens proletärer i England var närmast livegna, ägde inget själva, bodde trångt - hela familjer i motsvarande en etta med stampat jordgolv - osv. De hade ingen möjlighet att resa sig ur sin fattigdom eller förändra sina villkor. Om vi emellertid idag försöker använda Manifestet "otolkat" i en Svensk kontext så innebär det att det även idag finns proletärer, trots att det inte finns några arbetare som stämmer in på villkoren som sattes upp för vad en proletär egentligen var. (Weil sa också att en yrkesutbildad person med en egen bostad och jordmån nog att förse familjen med mat, inte kunde betraktas som en proletär längre.)

När jag här om sistens träffade en man som sålde tidningen Proletären så "försa" försäljaren sig i fråga om vilka tidningen riktade sig till. Försäljaren pratade om när han var ute och pratade med "gubbarna på bygget". Min tanke blev genast; hantverkare - är de proletärerna idag? Dessa gubbar är allt det som Weil listade ovan, som upphäver proletärens tillstånd. De har samma möjlighet att resa till Thailand som vilken tjänsteman som helst (vilket tycks vara vår tids mått på välstånd). Jag ska inte säga att vår gode försäljare tappat kontakten med verkligheten (byggen finns ju i verkligheten), men dessvärre var etiketterna han använde för att beskriva och förstå verkligheten hopplöst passé.

En annan incident jag minns var valet 2002 då jag läste igenom Vänsterpartiets vallöften i punktform. Ingenstans stod det någonting om hur V tänkte sig att egenföretagare passade in i deras bild av Sverige. Arbetare, arbetare, arbetare, var allt jag hittade. Som vilken frilansande musiker eller kulturarbetare som helst kan intyga så finns inga som helst möjligheter inom vår sektor att ha en anställning där arbetsuppgiften är att producera sin egen musik, för skivutgivning. Att jag själv ägde produktionsmedlem - min studio, min mikrofon och min sångröst - var tydligen antingen dåligt (trots att det är det som marxismen strävar efter) eller så hade jag uppnått den "status" som medborgaren ska ha och därför var jag ointressant. Att egenföretagare har det sämsta sociala skyddet av alla i det svenska samhället bekom inte Vänsterpartiet, eftersom deras väljare på förhand bestämts till arbetare. Detta var ett typiskt exempel på hur tolkningen av den heliga texten resulterat i ett misslyckande med att se att det i Sverige 2002 inte behövde finnas någon motsättning mellan att vara egenföretagare och att vara positiv till en generös fördelningspolitik.

Det jag berört ovan är några problem med att förstå vad människors behov är och vad de består i för olika människor - och hur det resulterar i en ofta omodern förståelse av verkligheten. En tolkning som blir särskilt problematisk när gamla begrepp som proletär smyger sig in, fastän dess innehåll helt har bytts ut med tiden.

LÄS TIDIGARE ARTIKLAR

Kristdemokraterna - vem räddar de? (val 2010)

Vadå tänker du, ska de rädda någon? I Jesus pass stod det inte "efternamn Kristus". Kristus eller engelska Christ är ett epitet som betyder messias - den räddare som det judiska folket väntat på. Att kalla Jesus Kristus var alltså ett sätt att signalera att den messias som profeterna siat om äntligen hade kommit.

Så om vi har ett parti som har räddare i namnet så är en relevant fråga; vem ska räddas - och från vad? Det som är intressant är dels de kopplingar som olika rörelser har till KD: Jag lyckades vid ett tillfälle pricka in en predikan med Ulf Ekman på Öppna Kanalen där han sa halleluja ungefär 300 gånger till att KD nu satt i regeringen (strax efter förra valet). För honom var det helt naturligt att inför sin församling stå och halleluja över ett "blått Sverige" (ja, det var hans ord) och förvänta sig att alla i publiken höll med.

Förutom KDs koppling till frikyrkorörelsen så är det också intressant med den historiska resan de gjort. Och då tänker jag inte på ett 100 års perspektiv. Under min livstid har nämligen min pappa suttit i kommunfullmäktige för KD. Sedermera övergav han partiet av olika anledningar, bland annat inställningen i EU frågan, samt en allt mer urlakad solidaritet med fattiga, utsatta och behövande.

I schackuppställningen som är svensk politik tycks KDs roll i sitt lag reducerats till ett evigt skanderande av orden "vård, skola, omsorg". Min undran har alltid varit; vem är egentligen mot vare sig vård, skola eller omsorg? Och ska vi ta detta som att de utsatta som vi behöver sörja för endast kan ringas in med hjälp av dessa tre slagord? Räcker det verkligen alltid?

Här tänkte jag ta tillfället i akt att citera bibeln, istället för en politisk teoretiker. Då tänker jag på Matteus 25:43&45 och citatet "Jag var främling och ni tog inte emot mig, naken och ni klädde mig inte, sjuk och i fängelse och ni besökte mig inte ... Allt vad ni inte har gjort för en av dessa minsta, det har ni inte heller gjort för mig". Skulle vi extrahera slagord ur det citatet skulle det kanske bli hemlöshet, vård och omsorg om invandrare och brottslingar.

Det finns förstås också andra grupper i samhället som behöver stöd här - och det här är knappast det enda citatet om att hjälpa utsatta i nya testamentet - däribland HBT-personer. Men där har KD en familjepolitisk linje som dikterar vem som ska vara lik inför lagen och vem som ska vara olik. Det märkliga här, kan tyckas, är att det är svårt att se vilka citat som familjepolitiken bygger på. Här kommenterade jag i ett tidigare inlägg på Annelie Enochsons (KD) uttalanden om att inte vara med i en HBT-parad (läs här).

Argumentet brukar vara att "staten ska inte lägga sig i" och sedan vad det nu gäller; vem som ska ta ut föräldraledighet, vem som ska jobba eller inte... Men faktum är att just när staten bestämmer sig för att arbeta emot människors lika ställning inför lagen (såsom i homoäktenskapsfrågan) så har man förverkat rätten att spela ut kortet "staten ska inte lägga sig i". Just när man tydligt väljer ut grupper som har gjort sig förtjänt av omsorg och andra bedöms inte förtjäna samma omsorg, då blir frågan: skapas inte en hel rad med "mina minsta" just av en sådan politik - en politik som skiljer ut de som är värda full ackreditering till samhället och dess backstageområde?

Min poäng då som nu var att ta patent på att vara de som lever i Kristi (som det så gammaldags brukar böjas) avbild är problematiskt. I själva verket har KD inget hemligt arkiv med en massa Paulus directors cut material som gör att de är extra bra på att uttolka vad Bibelns texter betyder. Och särskilt när ett parti som gör en sådan utsaga om sig själv (medelst sitt namn) aktivt skapar utanförskap och drar upp specifika roller som ska premieras i samhället, blir det mycket provokativt att påstå att man utgör någon form av räddning.

Det ska inte heller glömmas bort att utan KDs politik så är könsstereotypa giftermål mellan hemmafruar och karlakarlar utan skillsmässa på den mentala kartan fortfarande helt möjligt och lagligt, men inte ett måste. Så de har egentligen varken lyckats rama in hur de på ett särskilt sätt ämnar rädda vare sig stereotyper, vård, skola eller omsorg.

Eders politiske teolog

Jonatan

Nästa gång bråkar jag med marxismen och proletärer (ett av de värsta uttryck jag vet). Läs Simone Weil tills dess, så är du väl förbered! =)

Val 2010 - en ovanlig orientering

Det har blivit tid att skriva om politik eftersom - alla ni som läser min blogg vet att - politik är samma sak som religion. (För er som har missat hela det argumentet kan man läsa mitt "manifest" i tre delar genom att klicka på länken till höger som heter IMPORTANT POSTS ... summary", eller klicka här på del 1, del 2, del 3.)

Det jag tänkte göra här så här i perioden fram till årets val är att problematisera de olika ideologierna som är grundläggande för de olika svenska partierna. Min analys och kommentarer är informerade av ett gäng samtida tänkare från olika skolor, såsom Slavoj Zizek, Norberto Bobbio, Chantal Mouffe, William Connolly, och Richard Rorty, utan att för den skull helt stödja mig på en tänkare eller helt skriva under på dennes argumentation. Särskilt tungt vilar jag argumentationen på agonistisk politisk teori. Vad detta är har jag försökt sammanfatta i posten What is Agonism?

Jag kommer också att posta den här lilla "orienteringsposten" i ideologins förlovade (eller förlorare?) land, när jag uppdaterat med nya kommentarer till de svenska partierna och deras ideologier, eller om man så vill - teologier.

Folkpartiet Liberalerna - och Rousseaus liberalism

Kristdemokraterna - vem räddar de?

Vänsterpartiet - och det marxistiska mottot

Sverigedemokraterna - historik och verklighetsförankring

Ingress om Philip Goodchilds Theology of MoneyModeraterna - och Goodchild's Theology of Money

Socialdemokraterna - samhällsarkitekterna (och SDs motsats?)

Miljöpartiet - inte för alla

Politisk pajkastning

Henrik Dorsin om Jan Björklund

Ett teologiskt perspektiv på Valet 2010

Eders korrespondent i postmoderniteten
Jonatan




SOUNDCLOUD.COM/RAKKAUS-RECORDS - TWITTER.COM/JONATANBACKELIE - WWW.VAATY.COM - MYSPACE.COM/JONATANBACKELIE - http://www.facebook.com/pages/Rakkaus-Records/125353807494039?ref=sgm

Is it obvious? (Valenta)

Markha G Valenta sets out, in her arcticle How to Recognize a Muslim When You See One: Western Secularism and the Politics of Conversion, stating something that ought to be fairly obvious, as she critizes the cultural war/clash of civilizations-thesis:

"The West and Islam encompas histories too varied, too porous, too centrifugal to be coherent powers ... That isn't to say that we might not yet create them, or that they might not clash. But for the moment it is precisely the mythic nature of the battle that makes it so appealing to the fantasies of our politicians and lesser commentators, while it is only a minor drama relative to the so much more grand drama of invention that is taking place" (Valenta 2006:444f).

(Her whole introduction is in fact really well written.) What the article is dealing with here is the "clash" that is percieved in what can really more accurately be described as an value-irritation (I've borrowed this from Åke Sander's Swedish phrase värdeirritation which he suggests fits better in most cases, as rather than things being real threats to ones value system, it's more often than not merely an irritation of said system). Valenta goes on to show how the responses to The (muslim women's) Veil (as almost a kind of religio-political dark matter) have much in common with the myth of "the white man's burden", in its charge to enlighten and enrich the lives of the brute natives that me must protect from the dangers outside (in the world) and inside (themselves).

She also points out that this is not a one-project idea: "liberals and revolutionaries as well as expansionists shared the conviction that tribal peoples lacking territorial structures must succumb to modern states ... Something there was that must have loved a wall" (Valenta 2006:447). Valenta then goes on to display how various frontiers are raised and deemed necessary, both those of social status and class, gender, ethnicity, church/state etc. This, she calls the double logic of the modern territoriality: "the simultaneous necessity to saturate and to separate, to centralize and to expand, to fortify against the alien and make coherent the own - nation, home self" (Valenta 2006:447). What happens in territoralization is that the area defined gets all the more interconnected, integrated, and lets various forces and services (labour, transport, information etc) flow, but also included in the territorial package are such feats as police/military (some institution with the possibility of acting out legitimate violence). In order to make such an arrangement work, it has traditionally been argued that unity is called for in order to make such a territory work. But not only that, the territory as such is circled in the first instance by such an idea of (the possibility of) unity.

She also takes up capitalism as an interesting example of a universal dynamic. Capitalism only produces more capitalism (just like territorialization produces more territorialization). Possibly - and possibly sadly - capitalism as a universalizing agent may be more apt to function as it is probably in place, than the ethics proposed by Valenta. This is because Valenta suggests a respons to our mode of being, which makes a break with our colonial burdened past, and aims for something less ethnocentric-made-universalistic. Her suggestion is a mode of being and acting where we are to a larger extent prepared to utilize various forms of self sacrifice. It can be argued, however, that such a principle has a firm basis in a Christian legacy, depending on God's self sacrifice in the form of Jesus. This example may be both interesting and constructive to expand on, but nevertheless it does probably not amount to a less ethnocentric point of view, than the one Valenta has problems with. Possibly if we understand Christianity in a wider ("non-West") perspective, but then we also have the problem of accounting for Liberation Theology for instance, which has brought about decidedly positive and people-empowering change in South America, but at the same time rests upon a refusal of endless self sacrifice, rather than invoking it. In the end, it is probably mainly for the colonial powers that this perspective can be said to be a reasonable invokation - where one of our heritages (colonialism/the white man's burden) is countered by another (self sacrificial Christianity).

best

Jonatan

Quotations from:

Valenta, Markha G. (2006). How to Recognize a Muslim When You See One: Western Secularism and the Politics of Conversion. In: de Vries, Hent & Sullivan, Lawrence, E. Political Theologies: Public Religions in a Post-Secular World. pp: 444-474. New York: Fordham University Press.

Talal Asad and Laïcité

"It is often pointed out by defenders that laïcité does not require citizens of the Republic to be identical. On the contrary, it encourages them to develop their individuality. The flowering of individuality that laïcité encourages, however, is founded on positivism and humanism" (Asad 2006:519).

The secular state ought to be secular, because secular means neutral, seem to be the argument. On the contrary, Asad argues - and I would agree - that specific modes of being is encourages, whilst others are seen as problematic or illegitimate. The problematic nature is often located as or within religion, especially when that religion is not Judeo-Christian (as much talk revolves around these - oh so elusive - Judeo-Christian values, upon which Europe in general seem to be built), but are connected to other ethnic groups. Asad sums up himself by saying that "differences in class, gender, religion, and ethnic origin do not constitute a community of shared values" (Asad 2006:525). This suggests, that even if we do away with components 3 and 4, we would at the very least be "left with" having to deal with "the problem" of class and gender-significance. Furthermore, class, gender, religion and ethnicity generates other modes or being or identifying with people, than what is contained within the nation state. Asad points to Esther Benbassa who have made this point by asserting that

"precisely because secularism is a state doctrine, devised for the purpose of dealing with state unity, it does not fit well with a world of multiple belongings and porous boundaries, nor can it acknowledge the fact that people identify emotionally with victims in the past and with victims in other countries as 'their own'" (Asad 2006:511).

The nation-state today is therefor left with a scramble for unifying doctrines. That of laïcité is a French mode that is working out less and less everyday for France. In Sweden we have seen unsympathetic attempts to the same end in the past, both when religion was supposed to have this unifying effect, but also the "nordic race" was the posterboy for such an attempt (and Uppsala's racebiological institute got a soon-to-be-infamous sister institute in Germany). The main question is off course: Do we need to find one mode of unity to hold the nation together, that also requires us to all be the same?

I would propose, in line with William Connolly, that it is instead possible to find ways of relating to different groups within the population on different topics. This way, everyone is "in a minority position" in some aspects of their lives (as we may see eye to eye with the majority of the population, in the majority of topics - but in some cases we diverge and sympathize with an "outsider" perspective), which also stresses the way we treat all minorities as legitimate and equal. The way other people "disturbs" a part of our ideas/faiths/beliefs about the world, is a means to be reminded that we are not "finished" or completed persons, but an always ongoing constructing and deconstructing of our own identity/identities. Instead of getting all annoyed with the fact that other people beg to differ we should also allow ourselves to differ - on as many or as few points as we want to - AND to differ to different people. It's not always necessary to agree with your favorite party, it's not always necessary to agree with your spouse, your children, your parents, your neighbours, your colleagues etc. We may slip in and out of these identities in ways, where nothing is acted upon in the way that for instance laïcité proposes; that we ought to first and formost belong to France (or Sweden or whatever country we're citizens of). The fact that we don't always feel the urge to honor such an allegiance doesn't mean that we can't enjoy being French, Swedish or whatever. It just means that sometimes we also feel the urge to honor other aspect of (our) humanity.

best

Jonatan

____

Asad, Talal. (2006). Trying to Understand French Secularism. In: de Vries, Hent & Sullivan, Lawrence, E (ed:s). Political Theologies: Public Religions in a Post-Secular World. pp 494-526. New York: Fordham University Press.

HBT-parad - Nej tack/Ja tack?!

Läste lite till i Annelie Enochsons blog (efter det omnipotenta uttalandet kring Israels rätt att försvara sig från filtar, vatten, prefabricerade skolor och mediciner).

Annelie Enochson hade fått en förfrågan om hon ville gå med i Göteborgs HBT-parad, men tackade nej. Hon tror visserligen på människors lika värde, men denna parad hade också politiska ambitioner!

"Vid en närmare genomgång av programmet för festivalen noterar man seminarium för att bryta med heteronormen, störta kärnfamiljsidealet, stödja insemination av lesbiska, uppmuntra till adoption bland homosexuella och även till inspiration för polygami. Alltsammans är inslag som jag både utifrån min kristna tro och min politiska övertygelse absolut inte kan ställa upp på."

Märkligt, för det är sånt som jag utifrån min kristna tro och politiska övertygelse kan ställa upp på. Heteronormen i samhället är etablerad på ett sådant sätt att den får politiska efterverkningar. Det förefaller självklart att arbeta mot en politisk ordning som ger heteronormativitet (alltså en stereotyp könsindelning) förtur och fördelar. Varför skulle det vara kristet att på förhand välja ut roller som människor ska underkasta sig? Här kommer människor i regel dragandes med allsköns bibelcitat, men betänk då detta:

Vi vet relativt lite om omständigheterna under vilka breven i nya testamentet skrevs (för det är dessa som brukar åberopas). Vi vet inte ens med säkerhet vem som skrev merparten (och då brukar vi gissa Paulus). Kristendomens lära utformades mycket medveten om sin kontextuella situation. Kristendomen var därför revolutionerande, för att den som enda tro tog avstånd från grekisk "religion", dess förståelse av verkligheten och språket - och istället använde sig av ett språkbruk tydligt kopplat till tidens diskurs i grekisk filosofi. Detta borgar för att kristendomens lära och texter utformades på ett sätt som skulle förstås utifrån de omständigheter som rådde där och då. (Ett klassiskt exempel är referenser till homosexualitet, som på den tiden var liktydigt gubbar som knullar småpojkar. Jämställd livslång homokärlek var unheard of.)

Annelie Enochsons och KDs tolkning av Bibeln är en mycket specifik nutida bibeltolkning. De som gjort den har ingen särskilt tillgång till källor, som vi andra saknar (inget hemligt KD-bibliotek som de kan gå och gräva i för att få reda på hur det verkligen ligger till). Att därför formulera en snävt normativ familjepolitik utifrån nån form av "bibliskhet" är att vara ute på väldigt tunn is (jag utmanar dig: se hur många referenser till familjebildning du hittar i evangelierna - och vilka slutsatser kan du i så fall dra utifrån dessa!?). Kristdemokraternas manifest hittar sitt stöd i en värdekonservativ tradition, som hela tiden ligger i bakkanten av samhällsutvecklingen; kanske just för att det tar sån tid att tolka bibelställen som egentligen handlar om nåt annat, och tillämpa dem på huruvida det är ok att delta i en HBT-parad eller inte.

Läs inlägget:

Annelies blogg: HBT - parad - Nej , tack!

PS. Det är för övrigt anmärkningsvärt att Annelie Enochsons blogg inte tillåter kommentarer på inläggen. Mycket o-2010. Heja yttrandefriheten, kommentera nedan så mycket ni vill!

Commentary

"[O]n a serious note i thought all along that this is where you're heading... to me it's utterly obvious that our whole culture and politics in sweden are built upon super christian values. perhaps even more than other scandinavien countries... with our state protecting us from bad things bad like alcohol and other stuff. Or is that really a christian thing? Is it more of a socialist/communist thing? And in all it's atheism wasn't communism/socialism built on super christian values that jesus himself would've been proud of?What is religion? What is politics? Should it matter these days anyway? The only possible answer: P O L I G I O N. (now is it a strike of genius or just an easy way out???) "

Well, there are a few things here that I may off course clarify. But I will at the same time try to take the easy way out of the messy connections in here... :)

First and foremost, we have the question of what is build on what. As I've said earlier the birth of science is the outcome of (let's just briefly and abstractly call it) Christian theology's critical reflection on the world (as atheist philosopher Richard Rorty holds true). To further this example political ideas that has arised in the last few centuries in Europe, does off course not emerge out of nothing. They emerge out of culture and context (and like religion, needs to be reinterpreted in order to fit into new culture and contexts when we want to apply them). Here a distinction can be made between whether i.e. communism is strictly or loose built on Christianity. To claim that Christian ideals that saturates culture to a relatively high extend has nothing to do with communism would be to disregard its historical/cultural context. However, strictly speaking communism is focused to a larger extent on materialism than Christianity generally does.

The Christianity we have in Sweden today is in its turn inspired by communism, in a turn to legitimize a bigger focus on materialism. Here we have a perfect example of syncretism; christianity inspires communism inspires christianity. However, to say that they are the same would hide more than it explains. However, both have part in each other, and it is thus legitimate to take both traditions values or truth claims at the same face value.

The project of separating private from public is a discourse that has recieved massive criticism from various directions. However, the main and best formulated criticism comes, in my view, from feminism. Private-Public was a divide that served to relegate another distinction - woman-man - into different spheres, where man would be involved in the decision making and ruling of state (one forgets that even prominent liberalists as Rosseau held this view of women not fit for the public domain). Then off course, what went on in private was a different matter. This was not unproblematic, however, as the result often was that there was no governance over private affairs, such as men's violence towards women going unpunished (a fine tradition we've managed to keep alive since Roman days where pater familias had the right to do whatever he wished to anyone beneath his roof - he could kill his wife for all he cared without punishment).

So tying together this crash course in feminism with what I've said above: it is important to remember that relegating religion to the private - as politics is the subject proper of the public realm - is every bit as problematic, as it just continues down this troubled path. Besides rendering claims made from within religious traditions illegitimate (visavi state/public discourse), it also leaves religion in the private "secret" sphere where less light is shed on it, and it can be left to develop its more sinister sides by itself. Rather than the alternative of religious claims being fully scrutinized in the public eye, as they are legitimate parts of public discourse.

So, easy way out? Rather I believe that all matters of faith (and I think I've clearly demonstrated in previous articles how politics is all about matters of faith) should be set on par, as a starting point, and then see how they do compared to each other, in a collective open democratic discourse.

Snett, Annelie!

På sin blogg skriver KD-ledamoten Annelie Enochson och beskriver Ship to Gaza som ett "propagandajippo", genomfört att perifera sympatier på vänsterkanten och propalestinier. Låt mig här få komma med två påpekanden...

Det första är att det är omöjligt att säga att en uppsjö kända konstnärer och författare - delar av kultursveriges elit - alla skulle tillhöra den beskrivna gruppen. Inte heller är det acceptabelt att kalla en miljöpartist och tillika medlem av justitieutskottet för röd (det heter rödgrön koalition, för att det är skillnad mellan röd och grön). Dessutom är en av Sveriges mest välrenomerade religionshistoriker ombord; Mattias Gardell - som nu enligt uppgift sitter fängslag i brist på diplomatiskt pass.

Dessutom var skeppet fullt med judar för en israelisk-palestinsk fred. Annorlunda uttryckt: det går att vara pro-palestinsk utan att vara anti-israelisk eller anti-semitistisk. Det är också förvånansvärt hur Annelie anser sig ha bättre koll på var skeppet befann sig och vad lasten innehöll, än de som var ombord skeppen i fråga (och som Twittrade och smsade tills deras kommunikationsverktyg blev beslagtagna).

Att försöka koppla detta till en specifik grupp människor (vilka det nu är) som stöder Hamas helhjärtat saknar helt trovädighet. Attacken bör istället jämföras med en attack på vilken annan hjälpsändning som helst. Skärpning, Annelie!

Läs inlägget:
Annelies blogg: Israel har rätt att försvara sin nation och befolkning!

Religious Sciences & Theology / Empirical Research & Political Ideology (3/3)

So, after having discussed Philosophy of Science, and the involvement of pre-empirical presuppositions in Science and later politics, I would now like to expand on the third part of my proposal of studying religion and politics as a joint field - as if they are the same - and what implications this would have.

But for those of you who haven't read the first two parts, here are the links so you can catch up.

PART ONE: What Guides Science

PART TWO: What Religion Has In Common With Politics

Now, once you've caught up on the previous reading material, let's get started. :)

When I say that politics is based on pre-empirical notions of what it is to be human, and how we ought to live, this doesn't mean that politics doesn't deal with science at all. On the contrary, the state comission surveys and expert research in various field all the time. In Sweden these are called Statens Offentliga Utredningar (SOU) and are ways in which the state collects data in order to make a more informed decision. But (as reader of the first part will know) the question here is off course: how does one decide what research to comission in the first place? As I've argued previously what guides science in this case can be summed up as finding out how we can best implement our ideology in the current society.

There may be research on the table that may be discussed, but what it says will always be weighed against what the political party is trying to achieve; i.e. (taking a purely hypothetical example) getting grades from an early age in schools seem to encourage students to work harder but also apply more stress - now, how do we as social democrats approach this empirical evidence, in order to make society more equal, and generally more educated? Or taking a more sinister turn, the case may be that social democrats comissioned the reserach, and are only interested in early grades effect on education - and not in the least on how it affect students' stress levels; then this may not even be a parameter measured in the survey!

So what about religion? In Sweden, academic theology is not to be confessional. This means, that it is set on par with religious sciences in general, where the question of truthclaims within religion, is not judged (how can it, empirically?), but instead what is studied is part of (for example) Christianity: its history, sociology, psychology och religion, dogma and systematic theology, etc. More then seldom I've come across (both in litterature and verbally) people claiming that when religious science gets too interested or attached to a subject matter, it becomes poor religious science, which to many scholars equals theology. The distinction here is one where some scholars try to claim that they are utterly objective, but is that really possible? Again, lets remember what I wrote in the first part about all this - that what questions science engages in rests upon an idea of what things are worthwhile spending time on in life, in the first place. If we were to take scholars argument of total objectiveness this means that they really have no interest in the subject at all - because you cannot be both objective and attached to a question at the same time. If you are utterly objective, it wouldn't matter to you, whether you were researching the field of Islamology, Cancer, or how to produce a seedless watermelon.

What I'm trying to say here is not that science is worth less, because people don't deliver on the strictest form of objectivity. On the contrary, I think it's imperative for science to be guided by passions, ideas about how to make things (society, life, stuff in general) better, and last but not least; morals. A science without morals is a science that can lend its expertise to anything; You want me to build an atombomb? - Pay me, and I'll do it! I don't care who you use it on, I'm just a scientist, and the science of making an atombomb has nothing to do with then using the finished product! It is not that science hasn't operated this way some times, but the point is that it shouldn't. Especially, science can't extricate itself from being complicit in the things it has been an instrumental part in producing, and the results of such a production. The same goes for the production of information really. If a survey states that all members of group x hate group y, then this will have an impact on society. Group x may be looked upon with disgust and group y may all of a sudden recieve police protection, or new laws may be passed to support or supress one or the other... You get my point.

As you may have gathered by now, my general argument points to the likeness or correspondance between politics and religion. In politics we can separate ideology from SOU's - although SOU's are always guided by the morals and ideas in ideology. Similarily, theology and religious science have the same connection. Although, if it's not theology (with its morals and ideas) guiding religious science, there is always something else - and here is where it gets really interesting!

Above I wrote that Swedish academic theology and religious studies are non-confessional. So what are they guided by? The answer is politics. Every year there are new directives from the state, regarding how science should be done and taught. And when its not leaning directly on the curriculum - such as: all courses in religion/theology are "miljömärkta" at University of Gothenburg and must discuss ecological questions. (You can really se how this is helpful for a course in the History of Early Christianity, can't you?!) - it's governed by what institutions gets funding. For instance, more than once in my academic career, there has been no new doctorate studies-position offered. This means that no one can recieve a higher education than a masters level in all of Gothenburg that year - on any topic relating to religion! Instead, money are directed towards other disciplines; technology of different sorts tends to be hugely favored over humanities in general. This is for sure a way in which ideology guides science, and not only the science it comissions but ALL science in a community.

My focus is not to moan at humanities being overlooked as an academic discipline. However, my suggestion of leveling the playing field of political ideology and religion, based on accepting that both categories deal in the "currency" of what life is about, what it is to be human, and what society we want to create. I believe that this would create a discourse (societal and academic) where we accept that science never leave the arena of poligion (the name I suggested for the field), but are always guided by it - and that this is as it should be. The implication is also that different perspectives from religions and ideologies can be discussed, mixed, sometimes discarded and sometimes accepted.

This is also a way of saying that the Swedish (for instance) historic legacy is not one of suchandsuch. It is a "poligious" syncretism where Roman jurisprudence, protestantism, socialism, marxism, liberalism, feminism, and other poligions have been instrumental guiding principles that are by now so intertwined that it is often hard to separate what is what anymore. This, I believe, is also a positive thing, because it sheds light on the fact that Sweden has more than one "culture" informing it. This, most likely, is a perspective where it is less intimidating to let new/other actors on to the stage; such as biologism, islam(ism), confusianism (given Chinas rising influence in the world) etc... It makes us more open to realize that these "systems" are not entities trying to replace the "totality" of Swedish culture, but merely to challenge things, in the instances where we have given certain cultural feats priority over others without realizing it or why (such as politics over religion). In short, the perspective of poligion makes for a less frightening world, with a more generous measure of equality.

Best

Jonatan

_______________________________

You can also read slightly shorter text by me on twitter.com/jonatanbackelie :)

I'm gonna be ambitious (Van Der Veer)

Yes. I've decided I'm gonna be ambitious and write a few rows regarding the people I'm reading (and reading about, as many academic texts are written as replies to earlier texts and thinkers). I've been intending to do this for a long time, but have always ended up not doing it, because I need to write some kind of introduction. Now, I will instead risk that the reader may not get everything (or in worst case, anything), but then again, something may be interesting or thought provoking even so.

First off is PETER VAN DER VEER's article "Pim Fortuyn, Theo van Gogh, and the Politics of Tolerance in the Netherlands" (in de Vries, Hent & Sullivan, Lawrence, E. (ed:s). (2006). Political Theologies: Public Religions in a Post-Secular World. New York: Fordham University Press.) commented on in connection to Aaron Hughes book Situating Islam (sorry don't have the details at hand).

When Van Der Veer writes about Fortuyn he describes him as the classical populist. One of the reasons is that "he followed a very common trajectory from the radical left to neo-conservative" (Van Der Veer 2006:530). This is one of the first things I grew wary of in the article. The argument of postulating someone as a populist because they've found sympathetic feats in both the left and right camp, can suggest that someone indeed has a hard time making their mind up regarding what they believe in. It can however also suggest that the understanding of left and right as arch enemies is not always the best way to view the whole of politics.

Fortuyn was radically sceptic towards immigrants, and especially muslims whom he considered "backwards". Normally this is an argument that is percieved as far from the left. However, in Sweden, the work immigration came to a halt because of the union movement (a movement siutated to the left, due to its connection of the working class) in Sweden. Furthermore, even though the left and right in Sweden (which is not the left and right that is described in the article, but again there are probably likenesses) have different policies on immigration as a whole - the idea that politics is something that should remain separated from religion and religious claims is an overarching idea that Swedish politicians seem to have bought wholesale. Also, there are plenty of examples of irreligious sentiments to the left in politics, especially in the left's history. Marxism, for instance, has never been known for its generous attitude towards religious people. It's more been one of: sure, be religious, but the reasonable thing in the end is off course to become fully attached to the idea of strict materialism and thereby embrace atheism.

So, back to Fortuyn. Another interesting feat that separates him from most usual "right wing"-men, is the fact that he was gay. And not in a subdued closet type way; he used it as a means of breathing flamboyant life into what he described as dull dutch politics. The "purple" coalition that ruled the Netherlands at the time was also consensus-based in their mode of politics, and didn't care much for bringin passions into the political realm. Chantal Mouffe has rightly pointed out in her "On the political" and also in her contribution in the same book (de Vries & Sullivan) that these passions are crucial in order for the political to function properly. So that someone moved away from the dulled consensus and brought in both a flamboyant alternative lifestyle AND passion, have to count for something more than being described as just your "usual populist".

So what does it mean that Fortuyn was gay? For one, his sexual identity enabled him to compare a progressive sexual politics against (elements in) the Islamic traditions (which he no doubt bundled together as The Islamic Tradition). He then went on to offer the classical easy sollution of "the immigrants are the problem, if we can just get rid of them and their backwardness everything will be fine" (although this everything is typically never defined, because as you start picking it apart it always becomes evident how little bearing on society its minority groups have in many cases). So yes, Fortuyn gave in to easy - too easy - sollutions (meaning no sollution at all in praxis). This, however does not make all his criticism null and void.

In Sweden this year there was quite a debacle around Sveriges Unga Muslimer/Sweden's Young Muslims' (SUM) annual youth conference (the one I attended for my field work in 2009). The reason was that SUM had invited Abdullah Hakim Quick - a speaker that had previously made antigay remarks. RFSL (NGO protecting gay rights) opted for a cancellation of SUM's state funding and in the end SUM choose to withdraw their invitation to said speaker (although they maintained that he was never intended to speak on that topic to start with). Even though SUM withdrew the invitation to Hakim Quick, my fieldwork showed that many of the young muslim were opposed to the idea of allowing gay couples to marry. This is interesting, since this is one minority group who want their rights to be protected, at the same time as members of the group feel hesitant to extend rights to another minority community.

Furthermore, the sentiments expressed in my survey shows that although voting for parties on the left, these young muslims also expressed some conservative sentiments, regarding questions of family and morality. This is another interesting example of how the left-right dicotomy is not functional in order to understand the voters. If we were to apply Van Der Veer's terminology; are these muslims then also "populists"? They have sympathy with questions both to the left and right, but only for the left (and green) parties in Sweden. How do we understand that, from Van Der Veer's proposed perspective? Aaron Hughes proposes that it is not the place of the scholar to be a "cheerleader" of religion. When we do feel the need for it, we need to be able to "do science" in a critical way, where we feel that routing for, or being apologetic, or criticizing a certain mode of religious behavior is not a stance we need to take a priori. Instead we must allow ourselves to get to grips with both problematic and encouraging ways in which religion (and its different parts) operate.

We may for instance acknowledge that even Fortuyn - populist or no - may have points in his argument. My point with this argument is that he poses one interesting question within his argument (which on the whole, however, faulters in my eyes). This question also cuts through the division of politics into left and right, but at the same time proposes that we need to take passions (as Mouffe propose) into politics, in order for them to function. The interesting question, that remains to be answered then, is off course what passions? I for one argue for the legitimacy of religious passions, making their way into the political, not to dominate the discourse, but to be one of the many parts of people's lives which also needs to be reflected in representative politics. Anything less than full representation of (the) people, fails to be a representation.

The trouble with defining religion

As promised I carry on my mini-series of blog posts, which will present my view on religion and politics - something that may be of interest in the running up to the Swedish election, but also hopefully interesting in general.

This part is regarding the trouble of defining religion. Now, you may think that I'm kidding, right? - I mean, everyone knows what is and what isn't religion. This may at first seem like a straight forward deal that can be discussed in a matter-of-factly fashion, and if someone doesn't can't define religion then it must just be some scholars who are trying to stir up debate over nothing, in order to stay employed by their academic institutions. However, I would argue that the problem of defining what counts as religion runs deeper. I will give a short background, and then connect these to William Cavanaugh's argument in the book The Myth of Religious Violence.

One common way to deal with definitions of religion is to order them into the sections substancial and functional. The substancial mode of defining religion deals in what people believe, feel and think on the inside. Religion is then anything that evokes this special "spiritual" feeling, or makes you reflect, pray or worship in a heartfelt personal way. But in order for a substantial definition to deal specifically with religion the said beliefs must be directed towards something transcendent - a god or something of that magnitude. However, there are a great many things that are usually referred to as religion that doesn't comply with this seemingly straightforward (and very Swedish) take on religion. The classic example - because it happens to be one of the "world religions" is Theravada Buddhism. Even though Mahayana Buddhists generally view Buddha as divine or transcendent (at the very least in comparison to the rest of us humans) and therefor offer prayer to Buddha, the Theravadan branch is more "atheist" if the expression can be allowed. This is probably also part of why Buddhism was for a long time not judged as a religion in Sweden, but a philosophy.

Next, we have the functional definitions of religion. These define religion by modes of acting. Yes, there may be something systematic that referes to some wise being (even though we must include non-transcendent beings such as Buddha), but more importantly religion is about performance. Church, synagogue and mosque attendance for example - and what people do within these spiritual spaces: religions is that which have some sort of ritualistic(ish) behavior attached to it and that gets people to engage with their surrounding community in a certain way. Problem is here, that instead of being too narrow a definition - this is instead too wide, as there is no way to exclude other doctrines who bears heavily on how people lead their lives - such as political ideologies. The usual argument goes: why isn't Marxism counted as a religion with the help of such a definition?

The answer is, unfortunately, unhelpful. The respons such as that in William Cavanaugh's book, is that this renders the definitions of religion useless. But I think Cavanaugh is getting ahead of himself. How does Cavanaugh arrive at his conclusion about the usefulness of the definitions? The answer is that he beforehand has selected a number of religions (the world religions at the very least) that must be fitted into the definition. And when we find something else, like a political ideology, which fits the perspectives we've choosen - we fault the perspective instead of applying the tools at hand for the study of that which we've circled as being religion. I will return to this shortly, but first I will make a short excursion which is not unimportant in terms of the use of religion "as a theoretic tool".

There is another argument in Cavanaugh's book that deserves both attention and merit, which is his historical argument around the construction of religions in the plural. In early Christian writing - such as Augustine - religione ment the true worship of Christ. And other modes of worshipping other gods (which the ancient world was ripe with) was not deemed another religione. The concept of religions was in fact constructed at a much later stage in order to compare the Christian belief to the believes of people who were soon about to be colonized and conquered around the world by Europeans. In the first order religious comparison was applied so that the European expedition could claim: "These people have no such thing as a religion" only to impose their own ways of believing and acting out faith in a proper manner by force. Once the people had been conquered the Europeans incidentally discovered that they locals did indeed have some sort of belief system in place. Handy then, that the Europeans could apply a comparative perspective where we could argue for the superiority of the Christian religion above the local variant - something that gave missionaries the legitimacy they needed.

The next shift came about in the era of Enlightenment. Before this, the faith of the ruler was to be the faith of the ruled (subject). The outcome of the various struggles in at the time where nation-states started to form, was a mode of being where religion was not part of the measures used to control the people. It turned into a division where the church would be the benevolent caretaker of souls, but the nation-state would require the lethal allegiance of the people. In short, the rise of the nation-state produced a shift in what people were willing to kill or die for. Before, it was the church, now it was the nation. Bare in mind also, that the nation-state wasn't always ruled by the people in this era (more often than not it wasn't), and especially not by any women inhabiting the nation.

So where does this deeply problematic history of religions AND problems of definitions lead us? I want to return to the argument above where I felt that Cavanaugh goes awry. I would argue that this history and its host of problem is told in Cavanaugh's The Myth of Religious Violence gives us reason to think of the construction of various "secular" political ideologies are playing into exactly the same register as religions do.

What political ideology effectively does is point to something that it percieves as the good life (and society). This goes for religions as well. Furthermore, political ideologies does not back this up by empirical proof: "Look, here is the perfect marxist/socialdemocratic/marketliberalistic country" and then everyone jumps on the bandwagon. The goal is a utopian goal, an idea or ideal - something to strive towards. This, again, goes for religion as well. The intertwined history of the two - religion and politics - should also make it clear that the transfer of power between them has not produced a clear cut Robin Hood type of power-to-the-people effect, from evil to lesser evil. One of Cavanaugh's points is that in any type of violence - religious or no - there are always a host of components at play who are greatly important; ideological/religious, cultural, socio-economical etc. To extrapolate the "religious" ingredient and to say what this consists of, clearly separated from the other disciplines, is in his view not possible.

For me, this is another way of displaying that religion is not separable from ideological utopian societies and modes of being. Furthermore, religion is not to be excluded from debates about the good in life because of its especially violent or irrational elements, as Cavanaugh succesfully shows that no such elements can be extrapolated. But as I've said I disagree with Cavanaugh on one point: the point where functional definitions of religion is rendered useless by their entanglement with political ideologies. Instead, we should compare these to each other on their shared merits and acknowledge their messy intertwine-ment (is that a word?). We might just want to call it something else. If politics and religion is inseparable, we may want create a new field instead of moving everything from one of them into the other field (thus creating unnecessary confusion). My suggestion is that we call this new field poligion.

Sincerely and theologically yours

Jonatan

Election 2010 and philosophy of science!

In the light of this years election, I thought I would write a series of blog posts regarding the intersection of religion and politics. This will all be losely tied together, but maybe not in a thematic manner - after all, this is a blog.

So why write about religion and politics at the same time anyway? As I've taken a closer look at these two different topics and their connections, I've started to think that they're really not that different. In fact, I think they are, for the most part, the same topic. This off course may seem totally confusing, displaced, anti-modern, or just simply a matter of poor judgment. However, of this series of posts, I will try to demonstrate my point from various perspectives (that, again, sometimes quite losely tied to each other).

So where to start? I'm not starting with today's topic because it is necessarily the one that have to be started with. In my view, three fair staring points are

- Empirical = legitimate?

- The trouble with defining religion

- Religious sciences and theology / empirical research and political ideology

and so these three parts is what I will try to elaborate on, first and foremost. I will start by addressing the first headline:

Empirical = Legitimate?

We live in a world of science. Especially natural science forges the way we see the world. Not only in an academic context we do away with the metaphysical (things above/beyond the physical world as we can measure, weigh and test it). When people start talking about beliefs, religion, god, ghosts or aliens even, the rest of the room generally gets uncomfortable, wondering when the crazy person will shut up about this nonsensicle topic, and return to conversating about something normal (measureable), like Comspopolitans, Sex and the City 2 (gotta be good right?), and the (generally depressing) breaking news of the day.

So what are we doing here? We are effectively saying that "everything that we cannot talk about with a relative amount of certitude is not really worth talking about". I beg to differ. Ludwig Wittgenstein (the great philosopher focused on language's function on "organizing" reality) once wrote that the only meaningful way of using language is by way of science and describing factual states in the world. Apart from scientific language there are no meaningful language. But, Wittgenstate adds, the most important questions in life are of a different kind. These questions are the mystical or the unsayable which we have to stay quiet about. Wittgenstein's Tractatus consists (according to himself) of two parts; the written and the unwritten. And it is the unwritten part - about the unsayable - that is the important one (again, according to himself).

Be it as it may with Wittgenstein's position. We humans still (although not comfortable speaking about ghosts or the likes) have still found holes in this theory of not talking about wimsical mystical stuff, thus making life unbearable. There are indeed topics that we cannot stay off, blurry as they may be. One perfect example would be love. Even though we may not have much of value to say in terms of empirical evidence towards love, this is a topic that we have agreed that it is probably not best viewed through the lense of science. This I would argue is an important feature in humanhood.

Ok, so we don't view as a topic where science provides all the answers, but trust other things; experiences, emotions, and so forth. Admittedly no one can give an account of exactly all the things love is in their life, nor describe in a precise surgical manner how an emotion feels "on the inside". Still it doesn't hinder us from getting to grips with, and taking seriously, this aspect of life. The same thing goes for the purpose within life. [Here it is relevant to distinguish between the purpose "of/in life" and "within life", as the purpose of/in is more often than not a type of statement connected with a revelatory divine purpose. Purpose within life however is something that all humans create for themselves, insofar as they have the possibility of choice - for instance; I choose a career in medicine/interior design/being a stay-at-home-mum/dad.] Even though science cannot exactly attribute to us the best path to pursue in life, this is not stopping us from pursuing somekind of interest, dream, hobby or line of work. In fact, if science told us to divorce our spouse and quit or job we would probably refuse adamantly.

So why is all this important? Because this happens to be the model in which science came about and is undertaken today as well. Science starts from a presupposition about what questions are worth pursuing and looking further into, and are dependent on a view of how the world is constituted and that there is a possibility of gaining knowledge about this state of things. What questions scientists pursue is not dealt out randomly via the big science-machine - people pursue a career in science by the same reason people pursue a career in architechture or music or road construction: because it seems like a good and purposeful enough thing to do. So even though science have standards of empirical testing and "objectivity" (we'll get back to you later mr objectivity!) these standards are set by way of presupposing that the world is arranged in a manner where it is possible to apply these standards, and that the outcome of this scientific undertaking will somehow be meaningful and contribute to something.

This science of philosophy 101 is adamant to understanding how reality is percieved and constructed, and to remind us that the way we lead our lives in general is not informed by science, even though our way of talking about the world (in the second instance) may be informed by this. This arrangement begs the question of what competence science really have, and leaves a more open-ended answer than "it's not worth talking about things we don't understand (yet)", or that of Wittgenstein's. There may not be a scientifical way of talking about this, that is meaningful within the scientific context itself, but this shouldn't allude us to think that the important mystical stuff (like love of spouses, humans or even God for that matter) is not worth talking about. I would say that this is the cornerstone on which all great art is built: there is something within that needs to be expressed and it takes a non-verbal expression (or in the case of music: a musical underlining of the verbal matter) in order to celebrate and convey the feeling.

That's all for today. And believe it or not, there will follow a connection to this topic that will tie it together with religion and politics as I've promised.

best

Jonatan

Nu är den här!

- uppsatsen alltså!

Efter att ha arbetat med den alldeles för länge, är det nu äntligen dags att publicera min uppsats här på bloggen. Den kommer även att publiceras via Göteborgs Universitet. Så småningom kommer den även ut i bokform, något nedkortad. Mer om detta senare. Men hur som helst, här är uppsatsen som hållit mig sysselsatt det senaste året, och handlar alltså om hur unga muslimer relaterar till den politiska vänster-högerskalan i Sverige. Jag återkommer i dagarna med abstracts också för den som vill tjyvläsa lite här på webben.

Mycket akademiskt nöje!

Jonatan

ladda ner uppsatsen som pdf

Reflecting on Eliade

I came across something thought provocing signed Mircea Eliade the other day the "homo religiosus is driven by a desire for being; modern ma lives under the dominion of becoming" (Allen, Douglas. 2002. Myth and Religion in Mircea Eliade. New York/London: Routledge.)

I think this is very interesting, the difference between being and becoming. You could also label the latter self-realization; becoming something or someone (to quote our friends Daft Punk) faster, harder, better, stronger. Exactly what it means to avoid living with this before ones eyes and settling for "just" being, I'll leave open for now. But "just" being is also becoming something or someone - a completely other something or someone that what we are daily told we should be(come) by the massive forces of media and fellow humans.

Start

Today I'm heading to Gothenburg University to sign up for my courses. I can't wait. I'm gonna read some indepth political theology and history of religion focusing on theory and methodology. Yummy.

Summary

Every year, everyone and everything racks up a host of best of the year passed and so forth. I instead want to reflect on what I've done this year.

Parenting.

If 2008 was the first trembleing year of parenthood, where both of us read up on methods for this and sollutions to that (kind of like your child was a problem), this year has been smoother sailing. In 2008 some good books were read and placed in the bookcase, this year they've stayed there. A kid means infinite discoveries, and rediscovering, reassessing and understanding things quite differently. It's an exhausting but exhillarating ride.

Music.

Although plans were more extensive I released the I Need a Bassline single together with Waveplant. There's been some other music works in the wings, but I'm waiting for the proper possibilities for this music, rather than just throwing it out there on a wim.

Theology and religious studies.

After reading a load of fantastic books during the last few years, and thereafter having to sum them up in essays - always with a rigorous limit on the maximum number of pages allowed - I've finally been let loose to produce serious academic text. My fieldwork how young muslims view the political left-right-scale in Sweden is finished, and will be published as a pdf (as all exam works are) at the beginning of next year. But more excitingly it will also be made into an article in a book about religion and politics! More about this when it happens.

Wine.

I've found a little collector's streak in me. Although my alcohol consumption is modest, I've managed to try a number of good new wines, and more importantly; understand why I find these wines good. I've gained some knowledge about a few grapes and what characterize them. My main focus has been Pinot Noir, Chardonnay and Sauvignon Blanc. Chardonnay is wonderful because it generates such an array of wines. I really like American and South African ones that are heavy in oak and butter notes, and I'm also very keen on the crispness of a good Chablis (which is always done on Chardonnay). Even though I've so far been much of a new world-guy I'm very very keen on the french region of Sancerre. And I've learned, as with Chablis, that Sancerre wines are always made from the same grape, which in Sancerre's case is Sauvignon Blanc.

Bread.

To my great delight we had our kitchen re-done this summer. New appliances, and among them a new oven. And so I've started to make bread with a great deal of help from my good friend Manitoba Cream who is always present in my baking. I've also got a lot of inspiration from the blog Pain De Martin (in Swedish). As a rookie baker I've come a long way in a short time. As I'm writing this for instance, my home-made leaven Ciabatta (that has taken me three days to make) are in the oven.

Earlier, I've had some gatherings at home where we ate bread and cheese and drank some exciting wine. This year the wine pairing has gotten more informed and exciting and the bread on which the cheese is places - has been a home-made success!

So, not listing anything as the best or the most exciting, these are things that I've been excited about in 2009. It's probably no stretch to imagine that 2010 may look similar, although it will hopefully involve more music not only being made but also being released.

Best wishes for the futuristic year of 2010!

Jonatan

Julsubkultur

Såhär på julafton när alla firar kristus, messias - räddaren- är det kanske på sin plats att diskutera lite vad denna räddaren uppfattas i vår kultur. Jag skulle i all enkelhet vilja göra några jämförelser mellan vår tid och urkyrkan, de allra första kristna.

Idag är det snarare så att vi är rädda för suspekta kristna, än att vi ser någonting som är "kristet" som räddningen. Vidare kan vi inte idag tala om vad som är "kristen" moral eller logik, eftersom det finns alldeles för många kristna för att de någonsin skulle kunna komma till konsensus om vad det kristna budskapet innebär i handling och praxis. (Alla dogmer handlar också om att tro rätt, snarare än att göra rätt. Det är förmodligen därför någon kunnat enas om dem.)

När den allra första kyrkan gjorde bedömningen att kristus var den messias som profeterna i judarnas heliga skrifter hade talat om, så uppstod en närmast hemlig underjordisk kyrka. Utvecklingen i samhället gick från att majoriteten var skeptiska och rädda för de kristna, till att de till slut utgjorde en majoritet av romarrikets befolkning då kejsar Konstantin införde kristendomen som statsreligion år 393.

Trots att vi idag har en kultur som bygger på kristna arv, tankar och traditioner i väldigt hög utsträckning (märk väl, inte uteslutande dock), har vi idag andra narrativ att förhålla oss till. För hundra år sedan var bibelns berättelser de som vi använde oss av för att förstå vår egen situation, idag kommer berättelserna snarare från Hollywood och livsstilsmagasin. Min poäng här är inte att döma ut Hollywood (jag är en entusiastisk cineast), utan snarare att det som var viktiga byggstenar i vår kultur och tradition idag är främmande och lite obegripligt, vilket gör att vi är misstänksamma mot kristendomen.

Idag står vi återigen inför ett vägval där de flesta tror att vi behöver välja ett av de två vägval som rommarriket valde mellan. Det ena är att misskreditera och misstänkliggöra (och i rommarriket ingick också förfölja) de kristna. Det andra var att göra kristendomen till statsreligion för att den till slut var så mäktig. Idag pratas också om "ledkultur" på flera håll i Europa, när det diskuteras vilken roll kristendom kontra islam bör ha i våra samhällen. Idén om ledkultur och en kyrka knuten till staten är snubblande nära varandra och dessutom omodern och dum.

Från början var kristendomen en subkultur som verkade som motkraft till de förhärskande grekiskromerska idealen. Idag finns möjligheten att återigen låta kristendomen vara samma sorts subkultur, en kraft som bygger på sin egen attraktionskraft och logik. Vi behöver inte välja någon "taktik" för att "hantera" den. Vi kan istället nöja oss med att kristendomens (idag) alternativa logik kan få vara en kraft eller motkraft i samhället, en kraft som många andra om än spelande efter sina egna regler. Det vill jag hävda är en bra plats för kristendomen idag. När allt kommer omkring får den här subkulturens yttringar oss att samlas och mysa tillsammans idag och omge oss med människor vi förhoppningsvis tycker om och sitta ned och äta en måltid tillsammans. Och för vissa är det kanske en av de få måltider om året som äts utan stress. Bara det borde vara nog för att inte helt misstänkliggöra subkulturen kristendom.

God subkultur på er allihop!

Det postsekulära tillståndet vs Demirbag-Sten

I en debattartikel för ett tag sedan kommenterade Dilsa Demirbag-Sten Sverigedemokraten Jimmie Åkessons debattartikel med att hävda att alla gjorde fel: Både Åkesson och muslimer gjorde misstaget att inte göra skillnad på islam och muslimer. I Demirbag-Stens värld finns det alltså en islam som är helt oberoende av människorna som sällar sig till läran, existerande enkom i idévärlden.

När hon sågar teologen Ola Sigurdsons nya bok Det postsekulära tillståndet finns däremot ingen sådan kristendom som är oberoende av sina utövare. Kristendomen kan inte vara en källa eller idé utan är helt och hållet bara en historisk räcka övertramp och brott mot mänskligheten i religionens namn. Sigurdson vill slå ett slag för att kristendom (och religion) kan ha en plats i den offentliga sfären, bland annat i politiken. Men knappast är det på gamla "meriter" (läs brott mot mänskligheten) som kristendomen bör få ta plats. Att omvärdera vilken plats olika ideologier och idéer bör ha i det offentliga rummet är högst centralt, då vi idag lever i ett Sverige där gårdagens enhetslösningar blir alltmer absurda och illa anpassade till den faktiska befolkningen. Sigurdson är en postmodern och kontextuell teolog, men vilken kontext anspråken görs i och vilken räckvidd sådana anspråk kan tänkas ha är någonting som Demirbag-Sten helt missar att diskutera.

Och någonstans i hennes artikel heter det att Sigurdson slår knut på sig själv. Men där Demirbag-Sten verkligen slår knut på sig själv är när hon lyfter fram hur distinktionen privat-offentligt verkat för kvinnors möjligheter i samhället, alltså just den distinktion som feminister kritiserat mycket hårt ända sedan 68-rörelsen. Många grupper i samhället skulle idag hävda att en sådan distinktion är en illusion. Tänk om någon hade hävdat att HBT-personer ska förpassa sina sexuella preferenser till den privata sfären, men att ens personlighet inte fick höras eller synas i offentligheten. Det skulle helt klart framstå som orimligt. En uppsjö grupper upplever just en sådan problematik, att ens privata inte räcker till för att leva ett fullödigt liv utifrån sina övertygelser eller preferenser. Så hur länge ska oinformerade debattörer som Demirbag-Sten få argumentera för att en sådan distinktion alltjämt har en vettig plats i samhället, bara för att det existerar teokratier eller konservativa påvar? En typ av bevekelsegrund som hon själv vände sig mot så sent som för två veckor sedan.

I Demirbag-Stens värld finns inga bra religiösa utövare. Möjligtvis bara bra religion, men den kan tydligen aldrig utövas. Inte ens i framtiden, även om den gör upp med dagens brister.

Läs Demirbag-Sten i Expressen.

Visste du att ...

... "det allra mest kända kristna bidraget till alkoholhistorien är annars champagnen. När Dom Pérignon, som var vinmästare vid klostret Hautvilliers, smakade det för första gången lär han lyckligt ha ropat 'Jag dricker stjärnorna!'.".

Jaha. Dompan är kristen. Inte bara det. Dompan själv var munk. Eat that pingstkyrkan. =)

(ur artikeln: Skål för Gud och för Jesus! av Fredrik Borneskans, i tidningen Bolaget, augusti 2009)

En moral ska vi ha

Så verkar resonemanget gå. Jag såg precis på Skolfront som handlade om sexualundervisning i skolan, där filosofer och religiösa föräldrar motsätter sig sexualundervisning i skolan. Anledningarna var exempelvis

- det är en sexualisering av samhället att dela ut gratis kondomer
- jag blir berövad privilegiet att prata om sex och samlevnad med mitt barn
- barnen behöver inte veta allt i så tidig ålder, vissa saker kan man lämna till att upptäcka i vuxen ålder

Jag tänkte lite på just det här med att bli "berövad privilegiet". Ett sådant argument måste ju utgå ifrån idén att barn absolut inte får utsättas för olika moraliska uppfattningar. Om barn eller ungdomar (niondeklassare i det här fallet) får veta att människor tycker olika då går det åt skogen - eller? Jag har lite svårt att hålla med om det. Att RFSU pratar säkert sex med barn, oavsett om de förutsätts ha sex eller inte, har jag svårt att se berövar en förälder möjligheten att ha ett givande samtal med sin tonåring. I den mån som föräldrar över huvud taget lyckas ha givande samtal med sina tonåringar är de värda en stor eloge. Om de, därutöver, lyckas ha givande samtal om sex med sina tonåringar skulle jag vilja befordra dem till livscoacher eller inspirationsföreläsare.

__________________

(Så vad har det med teologi att göra? Naturligtvis att de som starkast motsatte sig sexualundervisning i skolan var emot det av religiösa skäl... Själv är jag skeptisk till att kyrkan 2009 bör ge sig in i en sexualmoralisk diskussion, men mer om det en annan gång.)